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I. INTRODUCTION

Winterbottom v. Wright1 is the culprit. Many a court has pointed
to its dicta to conclude that in the absence of privity of contract be-

tween a plaintiff and a product manufacturer or supplier there can be
no liability for bodily harm or property damage caused by a dangerous defect in a product. That rule has been broken down almost everywhere. The problem is that the process of undermining Winterbottom has created an erratic, barely comprehensible legal structure.
This article proposes to rationalize product liability theory by examining the basics of several areas of the law, modifying them where
needed, and assembling a coherent mechanism to replace the existing
rattletrap. For economy, I intend to avoid reinstructing readers about

what they already know. And for clarity, I intend to produce a spare
exposition, leaving to other writers the filling in of details. I will proceed as follows: first, to examine how Winterbottom fits into the general scheme of no-duty tort rules; then to review how the law was
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S., 1957, Duke University;, M.S., 1961, Worcester Polytechnical Institute; J.D., 1963, University of Michigan.
1. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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extricated from these rules, though only at the cost of creating the
mess that now pertains; and finally, to present my rationalization of
the law.

II.

THE PRODUCT LIABILITY CONFUSION OF THEORIES

The no-privity, no-duty rule of Winterbottom is one of many noduty rules that coalesced in the law of negligence as it emerged from
its common law antecedents. By no-duty rule I mean a rule of law
that always applies to a particular factual pattern to deny liability. If
such a rule applies, a defendant is entitled to prevail whenever the
immunizing factual pattern becomes apparent with certainty. It is instructive to recall that Winterbottom was decided in 1842, during the
period in which the emerging law of negligence was still in turmoil.2
Not until 1883 when Brett, M.R. issued his famous but rejected dictum in Heaven v. Penders was a universal theory of negligence uttered by an English judge, and not until the issuance of Donoghue v.
Stevenson 4 in 1932 did English law convincingly adopt a generalized
theory of negligence. Although the United States history is quite similar to that of English law, no single American decision rises to the
seminal status of Donoghue v. Stevenson in clarifying the law of negligence. In this context, it is no wonder that Winterbottom was decided as it was and survived for a very long time.
Needless to say, the no-duty rules were not erected without reason.5 The Winterbottom judgments relied in part upon the doctrinal
2. For a detailed examination of why these no-duty rules originated and how they have
eroded, see Little, Erosion of No-Duty Negligence Rules in England, the United States, and
Common Law Commonwealth Nations, 20 Hous. L. REV. 959 (1983).
3. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883).
4. 1932 A.C. 562, [1932] All E.R. Rep. (Scot.). Even Donoghue did not wipe out all the
existing no-duty rules.
5. A summary of grounds of no-duty rules is:
First, and perhaps most important is the very working of the common law process. When
obtaining a writ to start a case, the early common lawyer had to bring his claim within
the ambit of a recognized head of recovery, else he was without an action. Although
trespass on the case developed to ameliorate this inflexibility, the absence of a prior
similar case permitting an action probably remained of greater importance than the socalled principles of case in determining whether an action should lie on a given set of
facts. Thus, for example, in Pasley v. Freeman, [100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789)] an "action upon the case in the nature of deceit," Grose, J. felt no compunction in saying, "if
no such case has ever existed, it furnishes a strong objection against the action ...
which has been daily committed for centuries past; ... and if such an action would have
lain, there certainly has been, and will be, a plentiful source of litigation of which the
public are not hitherto aware." [Id. at 451-52]. Thus, as negligence evolved out of the
action on the case, the presence or absence of prior actions continued to be of importance. The irony of the concurrent operation of the doctrine of stare decisis and common
law evolution is that once a court decided there was no-duty as to a certain class of
injury because there had been no previous case, then that judgment would itself become
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ground that the injury was too remote for redress' and the policy
ground, unusual for an English court of that date, that liability would
seed an unmanageable onslaught of claims.7 Perhaps most important,
however, was the curious role of precedent as expressed by Lord Abinger, C.B.: "If there had been any ground for such an action, there
certainly would have been some precedent for it. . . that is a strong
circumstance, and is of itself a great authority against its maintenance."8 No matter how legally sound that reasoning may have been
in its day,' it is an exquisite logical non-sequitur. Nevertheless, it had
a legal double bite. First, it doomed Winterbottom's legal action, and
then, Winterbottom itself became the positive legal precedent that
doomed the actions of thousands of product liability claimants that
precedential authority for a no-duty rule of law. The fact that the law has not yet
shucked off these hardened rules is evidence that even to this day it has not completely
weaned itself of the ancient, pigeon-hole approach of the writ system.
Closely related to the role of precedent is the continued homage paid to rules that
are traceable to and lost in the ancient customs and practices of antiquity. Some of the
ancient common law rules sanctified in law certain interests that the courts were unwilling to see eroded by the competing interests promoted by a generalized theory of duty.
In particular, the no-duty rules thrown up to guard the special legal status afforded
property have been exceedingly obdurate. In general, the more ancient the roots of a noduty rule and the more closely it is connected to a status interest, the more likely it has
been to endure.
A third factor in the development of no-duty rules was the perception of judges that
liability based upon default, be it breach of contract or a generalized duty of care, must
not extend beyond some practical limit. In the main, this concern has become ingrained
in the proximate causation element of a plaintiff's prima facie case of negligence. But, as
noted above, the same factors that influence proximate causation also influence duty.
English lawyers refer to this as the "remoteness" element of the negligence action. That
term better conveys an intuitive sense of this restraining factor than does the American
"proximate causation" nomenclature.
Finally, bad lawyering was not unimportant. By this I suggest that some no-duty
rules became law either because plaintiffs' lawyers were unable to distinguish the facts of
their cases from the facts of the no-duty precedents used to defeat them, or the judges
were incapable or unwilling to draw the distinctions, or both. At least those rules pertaining to-products liability and negligent misrepresentation were influenced by this factor. Perhaps the facts that the products liability no-duty rule was the first to give way
and that negligent misrepresentation is a survivor are evidence of the merits of the respective rules, apart from mere erroneous application of precedent.
Little, supra note 2, at 968-69.
6. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842). The court per Alderson, B. wrote:
"If we were to hold that the plaintiff could sue.. . there is no point at which such actions
would stop."
7. Id. at 109, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405, per Lord Abinger, "[u]nless we confine the operations
of such contracts as this to parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous
consequences, to which I see no limit, would ensue ..
8. Id. at 109, 152 Eng. Rep. at 404.
9. Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 A.C. 562, [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1 (Scot.), surely destroyed
it as acceptable legal reasoning. For a meticulous exposition on the evolution of the law of
negligence after Donoghue, see Lord Diplock's speech in Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., 1970
A.C. 1004.
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succeeded the luckless Mr. Winterbottom.
Privity was not the only hurdle that faced product liability claimants. In addition the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had
been negligent in the design or manufacture of the product. Often
this was virtually impossible, especially as products became more
complex and methods of production more mechanized. These evidentiary hurdles were mere recognition that plaintiffs bear the burden of
proof of all four of the elements of the prima facie case of negligence
as it finally crystallized: namely, duty, breach, causation and damages. 10 Although Americam courts, and English courts 1 to a lesser extent, adopted various devices to help plaintiffs over these hurdles, the
legal concepts got mixed up in the process.
Donoghue v. Stevenson 1 2 ultimately resolved the privity issue in
English law. It does the job exactly as it should be done; by acknowledging that the issue is one of duty and that privity is merely one of
many factors that determine the existence of a duty. Although the
judgments in Donoghue's were strongly influenced by Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' 4 Donoghue's effect was more
general than MacPherson's. MacPherson clung to the requirement
that the product be "a thing of danger" in the sense that it be "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, '15 but Donoghue imposed no such restriction. Thus, MacPherson's "thing of danger ' :L" requirement maintained a vestigial tie to
Winterbottom's no-privity, no-duty rule, allowing defendants in later
10. The speech of Lord Wright in Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. v. McMullan, 1934 A.C. 1,
25, succintly sums it up: "In strict legal analysis, negligence means more than heedless or careless conduct, whether in omission or commission: it properly connotes the complex concept of
duty, breach, and damage thereby suffered by the person to whom the duty was owing: on all
this liability depends. .. ." Wright did not deem it necessary to consider causation, which is
surely a more general principle of law.
11. To this day English courts have been less helpful to plaintiffs than American courts in
overcoming the proof of negligence hurdle. For example, about English law Fleming says:
Liability for defective products is not yet a coherent concept of our law. The present
pattern of legal rules is an amalgam of contract and tort, of strict liability and negligence. It affords greater protection to the buyer against the retail seller than to accident
victims against the manufacturer. It still places legalistic concepts like privity of contract
before functional policies of compensation, accident prevention and loss spreading. But
reform is in the air. While our courts have evidently been unequal to the task, there is
now a good prospect of early legislative intervention.
J. FLEMING, THE LAw oF TORTs 498 (5th ed. 1977). Fleming contrasts the reform measures
adopted by American and French courts to the inactivity of English courts.
12. 1932 A.C. 562, [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1 (Scot.).
13. 1932 A.C. at 598-99, All E.R. Rep. at 20 (Atkins, L.).
14. 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 392, 111 N.E. at 1055.
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cases to argue that the old rule applied in a particular setting. Donoghue cleanly cut this away.
The "thing of danger" requirement was an early exception to
Winterbottom and it had the perverse effect of "proving" the noprivity-no-duty-rule. Its progenitor is Longmeid v. Holliday7 where a
wife sued a tradesman for harm caused when a lamp sold to her husband proved defective. There was no actual fraud in the sense that
the seller had actively misrepresented the condition of the device, a
circumstance which even Winterbottom acknowledged as a ground of
recovery for one not in privity.18 Instead, the plaintiff's lawyer argued
that "there is a general duty on every shopkeeper who sells articles
which are or may become dangerous, to take care that they are
proper for use."19 The court repudiated this argument, stating:
It would be going much too far to say, that so much care is
required in the ordinary intercourse of life between one individual and another, that, if a machine not in its nature dangerous, - a carriage for instance, - but which might become
so by a latent defect entirely unknown, although discoverable
by the exercise of ordinary care, should be lent or given by
one person, even by the person who manufactured it, to another, the former should be answerable to the latter for a subsequent damage accruing by the use of it.20
In Thomas v. Winchester1 the New York Court of Appeal seized
upon the Longmeid distinction - which was of no avail to Mrs.
Longmeid herself - to hold that when an act is "imminently dangerous to the lives of others ... the party guilty of the negligence is
liable to the party injured, whether there be a contract between them
or not."2 2 Thus, Mrs. Thomas was permitted to recover, without privity, for harm resulting from her consumption of a dose of poisonous
belladonna from a bottle labeled to contain a harmless medication.
The "thing of danger" exception to Winterbottom was thereby firmly
implanted into the law, later liberalized in American law by MacPherson and jettisoned from English law along with the rule itself by
Donoghue. The vestiges of the privity requirement as a factor unto
itself are still manifested in American law. For example, product
17. 155 Eng. Rep. 752 (Ex. 1851).
18. Winterbotton, Longmeid and other cases look to Langridge v. Levy, 4 M. & W. 337,
[1835-42] All E.R. Rep. 586 (Ex. 1838), as the source of the fraud exception to the privity
requirement.

19. 155 Eng. Rep. at 753 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
21.
22.

6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
Id. at 410.
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strict liability section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,2"
applies to "users and consumers" rather than to any person who
might foreseeably be injured by a product.
Curiously, MacPherson imposed a limitation on the thing of danger exception to Winterbottom that still endures in both American
and English law.24 In summarizing the MacPherson holding, Cardozo
added this qualification: "If to the element of danger there is added
knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
' 25
carefully.
With this language, Cardozo probably unwittingly tucked away a
new no-duty rule in the interstices of the law, denying recovery outright even as to things of danger when new tests were to be made
after the thing left the manufacturer's hands. Thereby a plaintiff
would be precluded from showing that a defendant knew or ought to
have known the tests would be carelessly or ineffectively conducted.
Although this curiosity still affects the law of negligence, the drafters
of the Restatement did not incorporate it into section 402A as they
did the "user or consumer" vestige of privity.
With a flurry of activity that has hardly caused a flutter in English law,2 American courts have undertaken to lighten the plaintiff's
burden of proving negligence in product liability cases. This amelioration has taken three basic forms: extension of the negligence theory
of res ipsa loquitur to situations that did not satisfy the classical requirement that the thing causing the harm be in the exclusive control
of the defendant; applying warranty theories to situations that did
not fit classical contractual applications; and the invention of the
pure tort theory of product strict liability.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 27 exemplifies the first of these.
There the California Supreme Court stretched the exclusive control
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1965).
24. The limitation on the thing of danger exception in English law exists by virtue of
reference to it in Lord Atkin's Donoghue statement: "[A] manufacturer of products, which he
sells in such a form as to show he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in
which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination.
may be
liable in negligence. 1932 A.C. at 599.
25. 217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053 (emphasis added). The apparent source of that
qualification is Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870), an earlier New York case in which the
unsuccessful plaintiff was injured by an exploding steam boiler, a device that clearly is a thing
of danger under the MacPherson analysis. To avoid repudiating Loop, Cardozo confined the
decision to its facts, namely, that the purchaser had tested the boiler after it left the manufacturer's hands.
26. See supra note 11.
27. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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element of res ispa loquitur to the vanishing point, permitting negligence to be inferred from the fact the bottle exploded in the absence
of evidence showing fault elsewhere. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich
Co. 28 exemplifies the second. The court in Klein fashioned a warranty
of fitness for human consumption out of the common law sales warranties of fitness and merchantability and applied it in favor of a
consumer rather than a contracting purchaser. Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products,Inc.29 exemplifies the third approach, in which the
California court imposed product strict liability as a pure tort theory.
It was primarily the warranty cases that plunged contract and tort
theory into the tangle that now fouls the law in many jurisdictions.
This entanglement developed in response to two salutary desires:
first, to avoid proof of negligence, and second, to avoid Winterbottom
when privity was absent and no MacPherson thing of danger exception was available. Both traps were avoided by simply applying contractual warranties in favor of a plaintiff who was not a contracting
party. Establishing breach of warranty requires no proof of how or
why the breach occurred, but merely that it did. Posed in modern
parlance, the issue switched from trial of a defendant's behavior to
trial of a defendant's product, which in most instances, is a much
easier task for a plaintiff.
Bringing non-contracting parties under the protection of the warranties of fitness and merchantability seriously departed from contract doctrine. It encouraged the practice of pleading negligence and
breach of warranty in the alternative, which consequently jumbled
the theories when the courts failed to keep separate the elements of
each cause of action. Deciding how far the warranty should extend
without privity often was decided concurrently with whether or not
some exception to Winterbottom would salvage a negligence claim.
Privity was mired even deeper as the dispositive factor in determining negligence liability, a role it never should have had, while at the
same time application of privity was attenuated in contract law, a
place where it had a respectable right to be.
The product of this confusion was a curious mixture of contract
and tort which continually created new difficulties in getting around
old ones. The well known Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.30 is
illustrative. In that case the wife of a car purchaser sought to hold
both a retailer and a manufacturer liable under an implied warranty
theory. The defendants responded with a double defense: first, the
warranty theory required privity which was absent and, second, the
28.
29.
30.

14 Cal. 2d 273, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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written contract between the purchaser and the seller expressly excluded the operation of implied warranties. Therefore, the plaintiff's
attempt to fashion a theory of recovery in contract concomitantly
laid the groundwork for what appeared to be an unbeatable defense
in contract law.
Had the court embraced a pure tort theory of strict liability the
denouement would have been easy. First, privity has no place in tort
law other than as an element in the consideration of duty. Under
Donoghue or any other respectable opinion, a duty would have been
owed to Mrs. Henningsen, spouse of the purchaser. Second, pure tort
strict liability would not have required the plaintiff to discredit the
defendant's behavior, but would have required proof only that a culpable defect existed in the product as manufactured, exactly the
same task imposed by the implied warranty theory. Thus, recovery
for the plaintiff would have been assured.
Not willing to be so adventurous, the Henningsen court took the
more cautious and cumbersome route of implied warranty. Avoiding
the privity issue, the court extended the warranty theory to the remote manufacturer on the ground that "social justice"' 31 demanded it
and dodged the contractual exclusion of liability on the ground that
the automotive industry's uniform exclusion of implied warranties
was "so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of
'3 2
its invalidity.
Henningsen got the job done for the case at hand, but the product was inelegant and strongly flavored by the particular facts. By
contrast, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.3 3 the California
Supreme Court under the tutelage of Justice Traynor made the leap
to pure tort product strict liability that the New Jersey court declined to take. Nevertheless, Henningsen, Klein and other forerunners 34 gave the court courage to take the step in a remarkably brief
opinion for so monumental a decision. The precise holding was, "[a]
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. ' 35
31. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83.
32. Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
33. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 397, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
34. Traynor did not cite his own concurring opinion in Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 453, 150 P.2d
at 436, wherein he had sought to apply pure tort strict liability eighteen years before. Perhaps
this was modesty, or perhaps it was because the problem in Escola was to prove negligence,
whereas the problem in Greenman was to avoid contractual defenses attendant to the implied
warranty theory. In any case the outcome shows that the new theory resolves many problems in
both old ones.
35. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.'d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (emphasis added).
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Although MacPherson was not cited, the influence of Cardozo's
opinion is evident. The emphasized portion of the preceding quotation clearly brings forward Cardozo's concern about new inspections
(and quite unnecessarily, given Greenman's otherwise total break
from negligence). More important was the similarity in reasoning.
Cardozo stated, "We have put the source of obligation where it ought
to be. We have put its source in the law."'36 Traynor said, "[T]he recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed
by law. .make[s] clear that the liability is not one governed by the
3' 7
law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
Despite these similarities, the basic rationale underlying the two
opinions is markedly different. MacPherson placed responsibility
upon one who places a thing of danger on the market. Greenman
placed responsibility upon manufacturers "to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."38 Thus, there
was a shift away from moral blameworthiness to risk avoidance and
loss sharing, and from negligence to strict liability in tort.
II.

RATIONALIZATION OF PRODUCT LLILrrY THEORY

A. The Prima Facie Case
As the preceding materials show, the reasons for the confusion
and overcomplexity in the law of product liability are mainly historical and doctrinal. The tortuous severing of privity from the negligence cause of action demonstrates the historical connection. The erratic building of implied warranties and product strict liability from
elements of negligence, contract law and preceived public policy demonstrates the doctrinal connection. Each of these theories is now acknowledged as a separate cause of action, but the courts have failed
to differentiate clearly the elements of one from those of the others.
This section proposes an analytical structure to eliminate this conceptual confusion. The principal assertion is that the elements of
each product liability cause of action, whether negligence, implied
warranty, or product strict liability, should be articulated in terms of
the traditional elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation and
damages. Then, the causes of action should be distinguished by defining subelements that play a role in some but not in others and
36. 217 N.Y. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
37. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
38. Id.
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redundant causes of action should be merged.
1. Duty
Duty in negligence derives from the notions of relationship, proximity, and reasonable foreseeability as developed in Palsgraf,Donoghue and countless other cases. As noted above, Winterbottom
grievously confused the basic duty issue by spawning the erroneous
notion that lack of privity was a conclusive ratio decidendi for a noduty rule. This notion has been eroded gradually by MacPherson,
Donoghue and the others but at the heavy cost of burdening the law
with unnecessary freightse
If tort connotations are stripped away from the core of contract
doctrine, duty in the warranty cause of action is easily explained.
Warranty duties are properly defined by promises: express promises
directed to a particular promisee or to the general public in advertising enticements,40 and implied promises embodied in warranties of
fitness and merchantability. When courts delve into the scope of
these doctrines, they ought to be thinking contract and not tort. In
this context, privity of contract makes conceptual sense. Even those
courts that have shorn negligence and product strict liability causes
of action of erroneous privity requirements might justifiably require
privity in independent warranty actions. Nevertheless, many courts
have extended warranty protection beyond privity, as in Henningsen,
and every state but one 4 has adopted some version of the Uniform
Commercial Code no-privity provision.42 Consequently, without a
specific judicial or legislative mandate, lawyers will not be easily
weaned from asserting superfluous warranty actions.
The key to the product liability tangle lies in the definition of
duty. Product strict liability duty should completely subsume traditional negligence duty as it applies to commercial products and
should complement, if not subsume, duty in warranty theory. Optimally, the three theories would apply to three mutually exclusive
spheres of coverage that would collectively and comprehensively oc39. No more need be said about duty in negligence, except that the courts should be ever
mindful that its breach constitutes a "species of culpa" and that privity of itself has little to do
with it. Donoghue, 1932 A.C. at 580.
40. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
41. Only Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
42. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978) proposes three alternate third party beneficiary provisions. A
extends protection to "any natural person who is in the family or household of [the] buyer or
who is a guest in his home ... " B extends protection to "any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. . . ." (emphasis supplied). And,
C extends protection to "any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods ..
" Id.
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cupy the product liability field. Negligence would be the residuary
theory,43 and would apply, without the Winterbottom limitations,
wherever warranty and product strict liability did not. Warranty with
privity would apply only where the plaintiff was the contracting
party. Product strict liability would fill the middle ground where policy calls for strict liability and where the plaintiff is not in privity.
Even better would be the merger of warranty liability into product
strict liability for bodily injuries and damage to property other than
the product itself, but that outcome seems unduly optimistic under
present law.
What, then, is a suitable definition of duty in product strict liability theory? No better starting point can be chosen than the statement of negligence duty formulated by Brett in Heaven v. Pender:
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a
position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not
use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to
those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger.4
The Heaven statement focuses on three elements: the first is the substance of duty, a matter to be examined under the heading of breach,
and the other two are the relationships of duty. Namely, who owes
the duty (hereafter referred to as duty of?), and who is it owed to
(hereafter referred to as duty to?). Brett's syllogism concisely summarizes the concept: one person owes a duty of care to every other
person whenever an objective third person of ordinary prudence

45
would have foreseen danger to the second in the actions of the first.

The "one person" to "other person" sweep permits negligence
duty to perform its residuary role, based upon its underlying justifi43. By the term "residuary" theory, I do not imply a minimal role but just the opposite:
the necessary coverage to complete comprehensive coverage by applying wherever the other
theories do not. Moreover, the entire discussion is about products liability. Negligence remains
as the central theory in most other bodily injury and property damage applications.
44. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883). Although the Heaven majority, id. at 514, 516 (opinion of
Cotton concurred in by Bowen), rejected what it considered to be an "unnecessarily" large
principle, this statement has strongly influenced the evolution of negligence duty including
Atkin's judgment in Donoghue, 1932 A.C. at 580, 582, 584, 585, 591, 592, and Cardozo's in
MacPherson,217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1052. Said Cardozo, "its tests and standards at least
in their underlying principles, with whatever qualification may be called for as they are applied
to varying conditions, are the tests and standards of our law." Id. (emphasis supplied). In his
famous Palsgrafopinion Cardozo later removed any doubt that duty is created by concrete
facts and not abstract ideals.
45. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883)
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cation of moral blameworthiness. By contrast, the economic and risk
avoidance bases of strict liability give it a narrower scope. The formulations of Greenman and section 402A of the Restatement (Second) are the two best known illustrations of this narrower scope of
duty. Greenman imposes duty of? upon manufacturers and extends
duty to? to any natural person injured by a product. The Restatement's duty of?. is broader and extends to sellers who are in the business of selling a product. The Restatement is both narrower and
broader in duty to?, extending it only to "users or consumers" but
adding coverage of property.46 Some courts have approached the
breadth of Greenman by extending the section 402A duty to? to bystanders. 47 More expansive than any of these is Alternative C of Uniform Commercial Code section 2-318. Duty of? is of sellers and duty
to? is to "any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.
...
8
Any of these approaches may be criticized. Greenman's limitation
of duty of?. to manufacturers might be unduly restrictive in light of
the economic power exercised by some distributors and retailers. Yet,
the Restatement's coverage of all retailers cannot be supported by
risk avoidance or loss spreading theory. Therefore, how deeply into
the web of commerce product strict liability should be extended is a
local policy decision that, ordinarily would be determined by economic considerations. Although who is an appropriate duty of? defendant should be decided in the evolutionary manner of the common law upon consideration of economic and risk avoidance policies,
a beginning proposal is:
A [duty of? defendant] owes a duty of product strict liability
to any person injured and to the owner of any property damaged as a consequence of a defect in a product sold or supplied to any person by said defendant.
This proposal may be criticized on the ground that it lacks a "reasonably foreseeable" requirement, leaving open the connotation that
even gross product misuse would not defeat a claim. Although this
objection can be adequately met by affirmative defenses, it may still
be criticized on the ground that defendants ought not bear the initial
46. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
47. See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (applying coverage
to a pedestrian struck by a defective vehicle); Codling v. Paglis, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622
(1973) (applying coverage to an occupant of another vehicle).
48. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978). Some courts have extended duty of? to commercial lessors of
equipment. See, e.g., W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Air Lines, 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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burden of proof in unconventional cases. A slightly less aggressive
version accommodates this concern:
A [duty of? defendant] owes a duty of product strict liability
to any person that it could reasonably be foreseen might be
harmed and to the owner of any property that it could reasonably be foreseen might be damaged as a consequence of a defect in a product sold or supplied to any person by said
defendant.4 9
Because duty is a question of law, it would fall to judges, not juries,
to apply this standard. Duty of? should be the initial question: "Is
this an appropriate product strict liability defendant?" In the absence of a comprehensive definition the scope of duty of? would be
litigated frequently until the range of dispute was dwindled by stare
decisis. By contrast, duty to? should be disputed only in unconventional cases and resolved by application of the familiar negligence
"foreseeability" analysis, keeping privity in its proper context.
Defined in this way product strict liability reaches circumstances
not covered by traditional negligence duty and might be permitted to
supplant negligence if its doctrines of breach, causation and damages
are no less restrictive than in negligence and if its defenses are no
more comprehensive. If all this were true, a court should always dismiss negligence claim's whenever product strict liability duty applies,
because a negligence claim could never succeed if the strict liability
claim could not.
2. Breach
Duty is defined by the relationships that create liability. Breach is
defined by an appropriate standard of performance and a suitable
test to determine when the standard has not been met. Negligence
duty is breached when a person owing it fails to exercise the care that
would be used by an ordinary person of reasonable prudence under
the same circumstances. Liability turns on the quality of the defendant's actions. His behavior is under scrutiny. By contrast, warranty
and product strict liability causes of action do not contemplate the
quality of a defendant's behavior, but focus on whether the quality of
the product causing the harm conformed to a suitable standard.
Thus, the defendant is held accountable for his product, not for his
behavior.
The promises made about quality are the template of duty in war49. The "or supplied" terminology brings some defendants who are technically not sellers
under the rule.
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ranty actions. Express contract specifications sometimes define the
standard, but implied warranties of merchantability and fitness as
understood in a particular trade more often apply. This article focuses upon the tort theory of product strict liability and leaves the
content of warranties to articles on contract theory.
In section 402A, breach is established by proof of two facts: that
the product was sold by the defendant "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property" and
that the defect caused the harm. Although many courts have adopted
this "defective/unreasonably dangerous" formulation, the California
court that created the product strict liability theory in Greenman
later rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification. In Chronin
v. J.B.E. Olson5" the court held that proof only of a "defect" is sufficient. This view holds that the Restatement's two-part test makes
litigation needlessly complex and imposes greater burdens upon
plaintiffs than Greenman envisioned. 51 Thus, current authority provides at least two basic standards of performance. Although the Restatement formulation has garnered a large following, no consensus
meaning of the term "defect" has yet emerged.
When a product fails because of a flaw in its materials or because
it was incorrectly assembled, the meaning of defect is virtually selfevident. The plaintiff need only show that the defect caused the
harm and, in the Restatement formulation, that the defect made the
product unreasonably dangerous. Thus, "flawed products," such as
the collapsed wheel of the Buick in MacPherson, pose no difficult
issues of principle although they may raise difficult problems of
proof. By contrast, cases such as West v. CaterpillarTractor Co. 51 do
raise difficult issues of principle. In CaterpillarTractor the operator
of a road grader, because of the machine's design, had a blind spot in
his vision when operating the machine in reverse. Mrs. West was
struck by the backing machine. Her cause of action alleged that the
machine was defective because its design was bad.
Proving a case of bad design is difficult no matter what the cause
of action.53 If based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the
50. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, (1972). Cf. the standard for strict
liability under Louisiana civil code: "[Plaintiff] must only prove that the thing which caused
the damage was in the care or custody of the defendant, that the thing had a vice or defect that is that it occasioned an unreasonable risk of injury to another - and that his injury was
caused by the defect." Jones v. City of Baton Rouge - Parish of East Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d
737, 739 (La. 1980). Contrast the case of Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Const. Co., 445 So. 2d
329, 331 (Fla. 1983), which suggests that the term "unreasonably dangerous" depicts the gravamen of strict liability.
51. 8 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43.
52. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
53. At least one author maintained that the job was inherently beyond the capacity of
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defendant failed to exercise due care in making design decisions.
Points of proof might include the defendant's awareness of potential
risk, alternative designs considered and rejected, alternative designs
not considered, and other factors pertaining to good design practice.
A product strict liability action may offer a plaintiff no adjudicative
advantage. No court has yet formulated a generally acceptable means
of distinguishing product strict liability from negligence on the proof
of breach issue in design cases. Even the innovative California court
gave up looking for a substantive difference and opted for a procedural one by shifting to defendants the burden of disproving defect
in certain circumstances. 4 Although it is premature to abandon the
search for an acceptable substantive distinction, the California approach may ultimately be the best way to differentiate the two theories on this point of proof. Meanwhile, an examination of the definitions of defect currently employed by the courts may be instructive.
Dean Wade provided the intellectual centerpiece of this subject
when he proffered the following factors to weigh in determining
whether a product is, in his terms, defective and unduly dangerous.55
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its
utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that
it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.5
adjudication in some settings. See Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturer's Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. lnv. 1531 (1973). Despite Professor
Henderson's temerity, the courts have pressed ahead.
54. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
One Florida court considered this approach but found it unnecessary to adopt it. Cassisi v.
Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1145-46 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).
55. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,44 Miss. L.J. 826 (1973).
56. Id. at 837-38.
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Standing alone, that statement would have been a modest contribution at most. Its lack of focus would require juries to wrestle with the
disparate factors without a synthesizing guide.5 7 Thus, the mere listing of factors would not produce a predictable result upon repeated
application to the same facts.5 8 Fortunately, however, in articulating
a test of breach, Dean Wade took a bolder and much more helpful
step:
A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to
persons [or property] that a reasonable prudent manufacturer
[supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful character
would not place it on the market. It is not necessary to find
that this defendant had knowledge of the harmful character of
the [product] in order to determine that it was not duly safe.59
Some courts have adopted Dean Wade's test virtually verbatim.
For example, in Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.,60 the New
Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Wade synthesis as the appropriate jury instruction to test a manufacturer's breach of product strict
liability duty, subject only to substituting the Restatement's "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" in place of Wade's "not duly
safe."'" This test possesses the twin virtues of repeatability and clear
differentiation from the negligence standard.
The Wade formulation is not the only one that has appealed to
the courts. Another approach examines the issue from the viewpoint
of the reasonable expectations of a user or consumer 2 rather than
from Wade's point of view of a reasonable seller having full knowledge of the defect. The advantage to plaintiffs of the alternative test
is obvious; it moves consideration of reasonable expectation away
from the narrow focus of the commercial establishment to the wider
57. As an example, see Thibault v. Seam Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843
(1978).
58. The court's willingness to pass the buck to juries without much guidance is revealed
by the comment: "A court will rarely be able to say as a matter of law that a product has no
social utility, or that the purpose or manner of its use that caused the injuries was not foreseeable." Id. at 809, 395 A.2d at 847. The court apparently did not envision that the exercise is one

of futility without a more concrete test in the sense of being unable to obtain somewhat repeatable outcomes.
59. See Wade, supra note 55, at 839-40. To convert Wade's test to the preferred terminology of this article one would substitute the term "defective" for the phrase "not duly safe" and
insert the appropriate duty of? defendant in the place of "manufacturer [supplier]."
60. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
61. Id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827.
62. Florida follows the consumer expectation test. See Zyferman v. Taylor, 444 So. 2d
1088 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1984); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981). See
also Foster v. Marshall, 341 So. 2d 1354 (La. App. 1977); Soans v. General Motors Corp., 717
F.2d 1511 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying Ohio law).
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point of view of the laity.6 3 Some courts have merged the two tests,
producing a conglomerate which absorbs the strengths of both while
minimizing the weaknesses of each standing alone. Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp.64 formulated the merged test this way: "A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller
would not sell the product if he knew of the risks involved or if the
risks are greater than a reasonable buyer would expect."
65
Taking a different course in Barker v. Lull Manufacturing Co.,
the California court prescribed alternative standards of performance.
One standard focuses on consumer expectations and states that a
product's design may be declared defective if the plaintiff shows that
"the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner."66 The other standard shifts the burden of proof. Under the
second test, "if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design
proximately caused his injury [the defendant must establish] in light
of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the chal'6 7
lenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
In sum, the cases to date have employed a variety of standards
ranging from the loose statement of factors, to the seller focus of
Wade, to the consumer focus of several courts, to the California shift
of burden of proof. Although a court might apply single or alternative
standards from this spectrum, the use of alternative standards as a
means to broaden coverage may confuse jurors. To minimize this, a
court seeking broader coverage than consumer expectations might
adopt a more generalized formulation such as the following:
A product is defective when it causes harm to a person or
property as a consequence of a condition that poses a greater
risk of harm than would be expected by a reasonable person
of ordinary prudence fully informed about expectable uses of
the product and the expectable manner and places in which it
would be employed.
This standard permits jurors to assume their natural role as the
"man on the Clapham omnibus" 8 rather than squeeze themselves
63. A shortcoming of this approach is that it does not specify what standard should be
used when a plaintiff is merely a bystander and not a user or consumer.
64. 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973) (adopted verbatim by Fincher v. Surrette, 365 So. 2d 860
(La. App. 1978)).
65. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
66. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
67. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
68. "In English jurisprudence [the prudent and reasonable man] has been traditionally
described as 'the man on the Clapham omnibus'.. . ." H. LuNTz, A.- HAMBLY & R. HAYas,
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into the unfamiliar shoes of seller or, even, a buyer or user. (How
many jurors, for example, ever buy or use a Caterpillar Tractor?) The
parties, of course, would not be stopped from adducing evidence
about the reasonable expectations of sellers, buyers and users. This
formulation is thus much broader than Wade's seller focus. Moreover, the use of "expectable" to modify "uses," "manner" and
"places" extends the context of injury beyond the narrow confines of
intended commercial purposes and circumstances to those that a reasonable person would have anticipated. A manufacturer might maintain, for example, that it did not intend a Caterpillar Tractor to be
used in the vicinity of pedestrians, but it can hardly be denied that
such a use is expectable on occasion.
Suppose a court were to adopt either the consumer expectation
standard or the more general standard proposed herein; what would
be gained by taking the further step of shifting the burden of proof?
The California court did so because "the fundamental public policies
embraced in Greenman dictate that a manufacturer who seeks to escape liability for an injury proximately caused by its product's design
on a risk-benefit theory should bear the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that its product should not be judged defective."69 A rejoinder to this is that neither the consumer expectation standard nor
the proposed standard envisions escaping liability on a risk-benefit 0
argument alone. Evidence on that point would be only part of the
evidence available to the fully informed reasonable person. Thus, the
shifting of the burden of proof alternative has but a narrow field of
operation. Furthermore, it.
is questionable whether the law should be
so strained in product cases, absent a deliberate decision to impose
absolute liability for harm done by products, whether defective or
not.
3. Causation
Most courts have applied causation-in-fact and proximate causation as developed in the law of negligence directly to the law of warranties and product strict liability.7 1 Nevertheless, under the rationTORTS: CASES AND COMMENTARY 152 (1980).

69. Barker v. Lull Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
The Court emphasized the "defendant's burden is one affecting the burden of proof, rather
than simply the burden of producing evidence." Id.
70. Under the risk-benefit theory, the social utility of the actual design is weighed against
the risks created by it.
71. See, e.g., CaterpillarTractor, 336 So. 2d at 90 ("The ordinary rules of causation...
are available under our adoptions of the Restatement Rule."). The "but-for" and "substantial
factor" tests of causation-in-fact cast a net about as broad as logic and justice permit. In addition, the policy restraints inherent to proximate causation are supple enough to conform them-
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alization goals of this paper, courts need not limit themselves to
applying negligence causation-in-fact and proximate causation doctrines to product strict liability actions. Although it is appropriate
and probably preferable to do so, it is necessary only that causation
principles be no more limiting in product strict liability actions than
they are in negligence. Satisfying these constraints makes it appropriate to exclude the negligence cause of action whenever product strict
liability applies. 2
Two additional points require examination. First, Restatement
section 402A appears to inject a proximate causation factor in the
requirement that the plaintiff prove the product "is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold."7 8 To the extent this exonerates a seller
for changes to a product that render it harmful, it preemptorily
breaks the chain of proximate causation between the defect and the
seller. This is different from breaking the chain of causation-in-fact
between a defect and the harm, but is equally efficacious in precluding liability and goes too far if it relieves the defendant of responsibility for changes he should have envisioned. Such an interpretation
of section 402A would often pose a more definite block to liability
than would typical negligence proximate causation analysis. This
throws up an unnecessary no-duty rule that courts should avoid by
using the statement only as a factor in the determination of proximate causation. The formulation of duty previously proposed excludes the quoted language, thereby avoiding the difficulty.
The second point requiring examination is the judicial confusion
about which negligence affirmative defenses apply to strict liability
actions and what weight to give them. What, for example, is the role
of contributory negligence? If the product strict liability prima facie
case rests primarily upon economic and risk avoidance policies, a rule
that precludes recovery because of the plaintiff's own faulty behavior
is out of place. To avoid this incongruity, some courts have turned to
proximate causation as the principal basis upon which a plaintiff's
case might fail. For example, if a plaintiff used a product in some
wildly abnormal manner or knowingly exposed himself to the product's dangerous propensities, some courts would hold that the defendant need not have foreseen such an event and that the chain of
selves to the goals of product strict liability insofar as they differ from those of negligence.
72. One Florida court has warned of the danger of too strictly limiting the reach of product strict liability doctrine, which the court viewed as an action to "supersede" negligence.
Hartman v. Opelika Mach. & Welding Co., 414 So. 2d 1105, 1109 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982). Thus,
the court refused to apply restrictive contract damage theories to product strict liability action.
73.

REsTATEmENrr (SEcoND) TORTS § 402A (1966).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

proximate causation was broken by it. 74
This approach, however, misplaces the burden of proof. As part of
the prima facie case, plaintiffs must prove that the chain of proximate causation has not been broken; whereas, defendants bear the
burden of proving affirmative defenses. Therefore, treating proximate
causation as if it were a defense risks shifting some of the defense
burden of proof to plaintiffs, thereby confusing the meaning and evidentiary requirements of the doctrine as used in different tort causes
of action. To avoid this, the functions of affirmative defenses should
not be merged into the doctrine of proximate causation.
4. Damages
The basic remedial goal of strict liability is identical to that of
negligence-to restore the status quo ante. Hence, no doctrinal reason calls for different rules of compensatory damages. Despite this
congruence, section 402A limits the liability of sellers to "physical
harm. . .caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property." This statement leaves unanswered whether various forms of incidental economic loss that would be compensable in negligence
would also be compensable in product strict liability.7 5 The general
remedial goals of tort theory and the rationalization goals of this paper are best merged by the unequivocal application of negligence
compensatory theories to product strict liability actions. 76 By contrast, because of the commercial applications of warranty theory, 7
product strict liability as envisioned by the proposal cannot exclude
warranty liability in every case without confusing tort and contract
remedial doctrines.
Punitive damage is different. Its basic justification is to punish a
defendant for wrongdoing of a sort more culpable than mere negli74. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. at 189-92, 194-203, 386 A.2d at
834-36, 837-41 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
75. Negligence tradition is itself parsimonious in permitting recovery for pure economic
losses not accompanied by bodily injury or property damage. For a detailed treatment of this
practice see Little, supra note 2. Whatever those limitations are might be incorporated directly
in the product strict liability cause of action.
76. See, e.g., Hartman v. Opelika Mach. & Welding Co., 414 So. 2d 1105, 1109 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1982).
77. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-715, Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages. The forward
looking thrust of contract remedies, to place the non-breacher where he would have been absent the breach, are, of course, conceptually inconsistent with the backward looking tort remedies, to restore the status quo ante. Much depends upon the special facts known to the defendant as laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854) and elaborated by
thousands of courts and many legislatures. Attempting to resolve these ancient differences in
one cause of action is too great an undertaking here. Consequently, the contract action must
remain independent in this analysis.
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gence. Consequently, it would drastically contort damages theory to
award punitive damages as an elemental part of a product strict liability cause of action to which proof of bad behavior is a stranger.
Although punitive damages might be sought in a product strict liability claim, the punitive damage award must rest on its own conceptual
bottom of aggravated culpability.
B. Affirmative Defenses
The conceptual confusion courts have experienced in trying to define the elements of a product strict liability prima facie case has
been magnified in their struggles with affirmative defenses. Here the
no-fault theory of the product strict liability cause of action and the
fault theory of traditional tort defenses openly clash. Application of
comparative negligence further compounds the difficulty because the
comparative fault heart of the doctrine simply does not meld with
the central premise of recovery independent of fault. Despite this
mismatch most courts have acknowledged some version of contributory negligence as a defense to product strict liability actions.78
One way around this thicket is to acknowledge that some modes
of plaintiff behavior will totally defeat a product strict liability claim
and all other modes would not affect recovery even if the same behavior would defeat or reduce a negligence cause-of-action. Volenti
non-fit injuria provides a suitable complete defense. The common
law origins of volenti far antedate those of negligence and rest not
upon negligence, but upon consent; one who consents to harm will
not be aided by the courts. Hence, it does no violence to doctrine to
say that consent to injury by a defective product defeats a product
strict liability claim. Volenti, therefore, provides a suitable affirmative defense 79 for courts that are willing to place the burden of mere
user negligence upon defendants but cannot tolerate holding them
liable for harm done to plaintiffs who know full well the risks posed
by the product defect.
Many of the courts that would apply assumption of the risk as a
total bar80 might be unwilling to exonerate plaintiffs from all forms of
78. Not even the ground-breaking California Supreme Court has been willing to do that.
See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). The
court repudiated a number of objections including that to permit the defense would lessen the
incentive to produce safe products and that the use of comparative negligence mixes incompatible doctrines.
79. According to the majority in Cepeda "the continuance of unreasonable exposure of
oneself to a known danger... seems a fair balance of justice and policy in this area." 76 N.J.
at 189-90, 386 A.2d at 834. The dissenting judge objected to the application of this rule when it
applied to a defective safety device. Id. at 196-203, 386 A.2d at 838-41.
80. Courts are prone to use terms such as misuse of product and abnormal use. See, e.g.,
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mere negligence. This forces a confrontation between the policies of
strict liability and the doctrine of fault. Various denouements have
emerged. The California Supreme Court simply ignored the conceptual difficulty and applied comparative negligence to product strict
liability actions. Finding generous support in the decisions of other
courts and legislatures, 8 ' the court labeled its approach "comparative
fault" and dismissed the objection that the prima facie case requires
no showing of fault with the assertion that "we . . . are convinced
'8 2
that jurors are able to undertake a fair apportionment of liability.
The court then abolished assumption of risk as a free standing defense and merged it into the comparative fault doctrine.8 3 This approach simplifies the whole scheme and implies that comparing negligences with mathematical precision is conceptually artificial and
empirically impossible. It also recognizes that juries must rely upon
qualitative factors to reach just apportionments. Thus, despite its
theoretical fuzziness, the California approach has the virtue of practicality at least when the action is limited to a plaintiff and a single
defendant.
In Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co.84 the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to accept the comparative fault solution, stating, "[s]emantic and conceptual clarity is essential if the jury is to
understand a defective design case, especially if counts in negligence
and strict liability are going to the jury. 8' 5 To distinguish the two
theories the court substituted "plaintiff's misconduct"8 for all forms
of affirmative defenses. Under the New Hampshire modified comparative negligence statute that bars recovery to plaintiffs whose fault is
greater than that of the defendant, juries are to be instructed that a
plaintiff's recovery must be reduced by "the percentage that the
plaintiff's misconduct contributed to cause his loss or injury so long
87
as it is not greater than fifty percent.
Although the New Hampshire court's quest for con.ceptual clarity
is commendable, casting instructions in terms of plaintiff's misconThibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 810, 395 A.2d 843, 848 (1978).
81. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 740-42, 575 P.2d 1162, 1170-72, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 388-90 (1978).
82. Id. at 739, 575 P.2d at 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388. This optimism was largely based
upon the court's perception that admiralty unseaworthiness cases had mixed doctrines with
apparent success. Id.
83. Id. at 743, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
84. 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
85. Id. at 811, 395 A.2d at 849.
86. Id. at 812, 395 A.2d at 849.
87. Id. at 812, 395 A.2d at 850. This is to be distinguished from the California pure comparative fault approach that would not bar a plaintiff's recovery until his portion of the fault
reached 100%.
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duct rather than comparative fault will not help juries much. Plaintiffs might even be disadvantaged by a subtle unfavorable bias lurking in the word "misconduct." But even worse, the formulation does
not do what it set out to do. Substituting the term "plaintiff's misconduct" for the word "negligence" does not result in any conceptual
purification when applied to strict liability actions. Moreover, rolling
assumption of risk into the comparison merely compounds the error.
Eliminating the consensual defense is inconsistent with a system that
bars recovery whenever plaintiff's misconduct, even the mere negligence variety, exceeds fifty percent.
In West v. CaterpillarTractor Co."" the Florida Supreme Court
took a third approach and asserted that "strict liability means negligence as a matter of law or negligence per se. .. ."89 With the ipsi
dixit it was conceptually easy for the court to recognize the plaintiff's
"lack of ordinary due care" as a defense to a product strict liability
claim "when it appears that injury would have been avoided if the
injured person had exercised reasonable care." 90 The court restricted
the defense to occasions when the plaintiff actually knew about the
defect and refused to permit any diminution of recovery when the
plaintiff's only wrong was failing to discover it. 1 When reduction is
appropriate, the rule of pure comparative negligence applies, 2 and
only egregious forms of assumption of risk 93 remain as a complete bar
to recovery.
Thus, California, New Hampshire and Florida have concluded
that in most cases a plaintiff's faulty behavior will reduce but not
defeat recovery 9 4 By contrast, the New York court of appeals recognizes "contributory fault of a plaintiff" as a complete defense to a
product strict liability action. Unlike the Florida approach, the New
York court also bars recovery to plaintiffs who fail to discover a defect a reasonable person would."'
An entirely different tack taken by some courts 6 purports to
88.

336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).

89. Id. at 90.
90. Id.
91.

In this differentiation the court was influenced by comments to RESTATEMENT (SEC-

OND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966) that sought to separate certain assumptions of the risk from

others. 336 So. 2d at 90. Accord Busch v. Busch Const. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977).
92. 336 So. 2d at 90.
93. See Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).

94. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
95.

Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342-43, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 669, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,

470-71 (1973).
96. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin
Islands law); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); Kennedy v. City of
Sawyer, 228 Ken. 439, 618 P.2d 788, 798 (1980); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prod., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978); General Mo-
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avoid the conceptual problem of comparing fault and strict liability
by acknowledging a doctrine of comparative causation. Under this
approach the jury is instructed to apportion not the fault but the
cause that links the harm to the negligent behavior and the defective
product. It is doubtful that juries will be much aided by this approach, but at least it avoids the conceptual mismatch that worries
legal theorists.
Each of these schemes will work.9 7 Juries will do their jobs as they
understand them regardless of the elegance or inelegance of underlying doctrines. Nevertheless, it would be cynical for a lawyer to say
that the rule makes no difference. Even without empirical evidence,
intuition and experience suggest that justice is more likely to be done
when the law is clear than when it is not. Therefore, a conceptually
consistent model is needed so that judges and lawyers may comprehend the underpinnings of the law.
I propose that volenti non fit injuria be retained as a complete
defense. Although American courts have largely abandoned the old
common law nomenclature, 8 the connotation of consent to harm
avoids the difficulty of distinguishing contributory negligence from
so-called implied assumption of risk.9 9 To be volens a plaintiff must
voluntarily expose himself to a known and appreciated risk, meaning
that no undue material external pressure impelled him to do so
against better judgment. Whether a court employs the term volenti
or the more familiar "assumption of risk," it should permit no presumption that the plaintiff was volens. Instead, the defendant should
be required to adduce objective facts to persuade the jury that the
tors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977). In Busch v. Busch Const., Inc., 262
N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977), the Minnesota court justified the mixing of doctrines on the basis
that the issue was more one of comparative cause rather than comparative fault (citing Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases,
58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 725 (1974)). With due respect, this must be rejected as faulty analysis.
Nowhere in the law of torts is any more required either in defense or prima facie cases than
that a particular act be a cause, not the cause, in order to assign full responsibility. Moreover,
the comparative cause approach suggests that a slightly negligent act that was a clear cause
would weigh more heavily against a plaintiff than an egregiously negligent act that was a
"slight" cause. These distinctions are conceptually difficult and practically impossible. They
should be avoided.
97. Other cases that have mired negligence and strict liability are Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Zahrte v. Strum, Ruger & Co., 661
P.2d 17 (Mont. 1983); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of G.M., 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982);
Fiske v. MacGregor Div. of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski
Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
98. The English courts, however, have retained the doctrine. See, e.g., Imperial Chem.
Indus. Ltd. v. Shatwell, 1965 A.C. 683.
99. See especially, Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977) and Meistrich v. Casino
Arena Attractions Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959), both of which assert that some assumptions of risk were merely forms of contributory negligence.
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plaintiff knew, appreciated, and proceeded without undue compulsion. No other defense should be permitted to bar a product strict
liability recovery.
The harder job is dealing with negligent conduct. The New York
total bar unnecessarily restricts loss spreading and risk avoidance
policies of product strict liability. Potential product liability defendants should foresee that negligent misuse will compound the dangers of defective products and should guard against this potential in
one way or another. On the other hand, although a court may conclude that the policies of loss avoidance and cost spreading justifies
the elimination of mere negligence as a defense to product strict liability actions, other policies dictate against it. Because self-determination remains a central policy in our law, most courts are unwilling
to abandon contributory negligence as a defensive factor even in
product strict liability actions. A compromise in the middle ground
most often emerges. The California, New Hampshire, Florida and
New York solutions represent four forms of accommodation, but the
methodology of each is inartful at best. The oranges of negligence
need to be melded with the apples of product strict liability 00 in a
miscible invention of terminology and doctrine. Far from apostasy,
this is precisely the course that some courts have taken covertly for
years in extending warranty theory 0 1 and that Greenman and its
successors have taken openly in applying product strict liability. One
suitable approach is to borrow once again from the law of contracts,
not by contorting more "proliferating exceptions" 10 2 but by honest
analogy. Although a contractual promisor owes his promisee an absolute obligation not to breach his promise, contract law does not permit the promisee of a broken promise to sit idly by while contract
damages pile up. The contractual relationship imposes a duty upon
the promisee not only to protect himself but also to protect the interests of the breaching promisor. 10 3 Thus, the duty of the promisee is to
mitigate the breaching promisor's damages.
By analogy, a duty may be imposed upon product strict liability
plaintiffs to protect defendants against unnecessary losses. The
100.

Apologies to Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167,

144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (1978).
101. See Cronin, 8 Cal 3d at 129, 501 P.2d at 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (court refers to
the "fictions of warranty").
102.

Codling v. Paglia refers to "the temptation to devise more proliferating exceptions."

32 N.Y.2d at 339, 298 N.E.2d at 626, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
103. This reflects in part the Holmesian view of freedom of contract; a bound party has
the option to perform or to breach and pay damages. The latter option is rendered nugatory if

the non-breacher can merely sit on his hands while damages accrue. "The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it - and
nothing else." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv.L. Rv. 457 (1897).
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source of this duty is not found in contract or in the duty of selfprotection which supports contributory negligence, 10 4 but arises from
the policies of product strict liability, especially that of risk avoidance. Each person is ordinarily in a better position than anyone else
to avoid personal harm resulting from his own heedlessness. So long
as the economic and security interests of others are not placed at
risk, each person may choose whether to protect himself or not, but
when the economic interest of someone else is involved, even if it is
only the obligation to pay damages, the plaintiff's interest in his own
security rises to the notice of the law. The thought was exquisitely
expressed by Lord Denning's judgment that a plaintiff is contributorily negligent for failing to wear an available seat belt:
Everyone is free to wear it or not, as he pleases. Free in this
sense, that if he does not wear it, he is free from any penalty
by the magistrates. Free in the sense that everyone is free to
run his head against a brick wall, if he pleases. He can do it if
he likes without being punished by the law. But it is not a
sensible thing to do. If he does it, it is his own 105
fault; and he
has only himself to thank for the consequences.
The very law that imposes a no-fault duty upon defendants imposes a counter obligation upon plaintiffs to take care to avoid unnecessary losses. I have resisted the temptation to refer to this obligation as a duty to mitigate damages because contract law employs
that term to describe a duty that arises after an accident has occurred.1 08 I also refuse to employ a metaphorical term such as "akin
to mitigation" in the manner that "akin to res ipsa loquitur" terminology has been used.10 " This has no value in instructing juries. Accordingly, I will simply refer to the obligation as the "plaintiff's duty
to prevent harm." It does not preclude application of volenti non fit
104. Most American courts acknowledge that negligence theory imposes a duty upon
plaintiffs to act reasonably to protect themselves. See, e.g., CaterpillarTractor, 336 So. 2d at
90. Although all English judges do not agree, the prevailing English view does: "Negligence is a
man's carelessness in Breach of duty to others. Contributory negligence is a man's carelessness
in looking after his own safety. He is guilty of contributorynegligence if he ought reasonably to
have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonably prudent man, he might be hurt himself. . . ." Froom v. Butcher, 1976 Q.B. 286, 291 (C.A.) (Lord Denning). Froom held it to be
contributory negligence not to wear an automobile seat belt.
105. Froom v. Butcher, 1976 Q.B. 286, 293 (C.A.) (Lord Denning).
106. "[T]he concepts of mitigation of damages and avoidable consequences have traditionally been applied only to post-accident conduct . . . the opportunity to mitigate damages
prior to the occurrence of an accident does not ordinarily arise, and . . . the chronological distinction, on which the concept of mitigation rests, is justified in most cases. . . ." Annot., 80
A.L.R.3d 1033, 1038.
107. See, e.g., Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 300, 338 A.2d 1, 5 (1974).
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injuria as a complete bar but does exclude the operation of every
other affirmative defense. In applying this duty, a jurisdiction might
include an obligation to become aware of defects, as in New York, or
exclude it, as in Florida, depending upon local assessment of the balance of policies. In either case, the burden of proof would be upon
the defendant. Although courts will couch jury instructions in their
preferred terminology and adjust them as experience requires, the
following version expresses the substance of the doctrine:
Each person has a duty to prevent harm when using or consuming a product supplied by someone else. This includes the
duty not to expose the defendant to unnecessary losses in
paying for injuries and damages that would not occur if the
duty to prevent harm is observed. The duty may be breached
if a plaintiff did not discover a defect that a reasonable person
should have discovered under the circumstances108 or if he
discovered the defect, and thereafter did not use the care a
reasonable person should have used to prevent harm. The
burden of proving that the plaintiff breached the duty to prevent harm rests upon the defendant. If the evidence does not
persuade you that the duty was breached then you must find
that it was not and damages may not be diminished.
If you find that the plaintiff breached the duty to prevent
harm, then you must decide how his losses should be apportioned between him and the defendants based upon your evaluation of all the evidence in this case that goes to the justice
of the matter. You should express your conclusion in percentage of harm apportioned to the plaintiff and percentage apportioned to the defendants collectively. The sum must be
100%. For example, if you apportion 50% of the harm to the
defendants, then 50% would be assigned the plaintiff, and the
amount of his recovery would be his full losses as found by
you minus 50%.109

Together volenti non fit injuria and the duty to prevent harm
provide suitable 10 defenses to the product strict liability action.
108. This clause would be omitted in a jurisdiction that follows the Florida view. Accord
Busch v. Busch Const. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977).
109. This clause is drafted for a pure comparative negligence system. It would be adjusted
to impose the 50% bar rule in jurisdictions that follow the New Hampshire view and as appropriate in other modified comparative negligence systems.
110. According to Larson, there is little authority for the proposition expressed in the
duty to prevent harm. A. LARSON, 2A Tim LAw oF WORKMES's CO? .NSSATION § 76.84 n.48
(1982). Nevertheless, the problem remains and needs a solution that does not rest, necessarily,
upon established doctrine. The proposition is fully in keeping with the goals and methods of
modern tort law.
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They are compatible in a doctrinal sense and are equally or more
comprehensible to jurors than the others examined herein."' They
also are flexible. Courts that do not wish to recognize volenti may
merge it into the duty to prevent harm.
C. Contribututionand Indemnification
Assume, contrary to common law, that adjustment of liabilities
among joint defendants is permitted. How should the adjustment be
made when the liability of all defendants rests upon product strict
liability or when some defendants are liable on that theory but others
1 2
in negligence or warranty?
In making these adjustments, the common law theory of indemnification among joint tortfeasors need not be abandoned. That is, if
one tortfeasor was actively blameworthy and the other only vicariously liable on technical grounds," 3 then the technically liable but
111. The model proposed here also conforms to more general models such as that of Professor Johnson:
[T]ort cases may be divided into three broad categories:
(a) those in which a defendant's duty extends to the protection of a plaintiff against
his own carelessness; (b) those in which the defendant is not liable because the plaintiff's
conduct has produced a situation for which the law should not require a reasonably prudent person to prepare and respond; and
(c) those that fall in neither category, in which the victim's fault and the defendant's
fault may each be weighed in the balance.
Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA. L. REV. 319, 333 (1980).
Application of volenti satisfies (b); application of the Florida refusal to hold a plaintiff responsible for failing to detect-a defect satisfies (a); and application of duty to prevent harm satisfies

(c).
112. One may find more fluid rules for distributing losses or sharing benefits in several
areas of the law, including workers' compensation see, e.g., Arex Indemnity Co. v. Radin, 72 So.
2d 393 (Fla. 1954), and divorce see, e.g., Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1980). In
workers' compensation, the dispute is between an injured worker, who has gained a tort recovery from a third party, and the workers' compensation insurance company that wants to be
reimbursed for the workers' compensation payments made to the worker. In that setting, equitable distribution generally permits the injured victim to retain that amount of his net tort
recovery which when added to the workers' compensation benefits received will provide full
compensation for his losses. In divorce, the dispute is between divorcing spouses in dividing the
property of the marriage. Equity generally requires the division to reflect the respective contributions of the parties to the original acquisition of the property.
Clearly, the alimony equitable distribution cases are closer to the point. Principles of sharing that control the division of assets can apply equally to apportion losses. Nevertheless, no
useful purpose is to be served by examining those cases, because the tort cases that have already jettisoned the no-contribution rule have blazed an adequate trail as far as negligent joint
tortfeasors are concerned. Unfortunately, however, their notion of comparative fault does not
adequately resolve disputes involving two enterprise liability tortfeasors or those involving one
tortfeasor who is liable on enterprise liability grounds and another in negligence.
113. The most common form of vicarious liability is respondeat superior. The Florida
Supreme Court explained the theory more generally in Houdaille Indus. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d
490, 492 (1979), as follows:
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otherwise innocent tortfeasor should be permitted to transfer the entire loss to the truly culpable tortfeasor. Comparisons of fault are difficult, however, when the plaintiff has not been required to prove
negligence as a part of his case against the tortfeasors. This difficulty
is exacerbated if indemnification is augmented by a system of
contribution.
Guidance may be sought from the jurisdictions that impose contribution among joint tortfeasors. Although some jurisdictions have
by judicial fiat abandoned the common law no-contribution rule,114
most have done so by legislatively adopting some variant of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. 15 The allocative
core of the Uniform Act illustrates the most common approach:
In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire
liability (a) Their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered; (b) If equity requires the collective liability of some as a
group shall constitute a single share; and (c) Principles of eqIndemnity is a right which inures to one who discharges a duty owed by him, but which,
as between himself and another, should have been discharged by the other and is allowable only where the whole fault is in the one against whom indemnity is sought. (citing
Stuart v. Hertz Corporation, 351 So. 2d 703 (1977)). It shifts the entire loss from one
who, although without active negligence or fault, has been obligated to pay, because of
some vicarious, constructive, derivative, or technical liability, to another who should bear
the costs because it was the latter's wrongdoing for which the former is held liable.
That the court was willing to tighten up indemnity may reflect the earlier adoption of contribution in the state.
The active-passive tortfeasor theory of indemnification was once widely accepted as a basis
for deciding when indemnity should and should not be applied. This theory was repudiated by
Houdaille and has been criticized by numerous courts including the New York Court of Appeal
that said, "[T]he 'active-passive' test to determine when indemnification will be allowed by one
party held liable for negligence against another negligent party has in practice proven elusive
and difficult of fair application." Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288,
291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972). The court later referred to the doctrine as "artificial." Id. at
150, 282 N.E.2d at 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
114. As early as 1918, Wisconsin adopted contribution by judicial fiat. Ellis v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918) (according to Ellis, the no contribution rule had
not been settled in Wisconsin). Id. at 403, 167 N.W. at 1051. The California Supreme Court
sidestepped the no-contribution rule by creating the doctrine of "equitable indemnification."
Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964). The theory of equitable
indemnity was applied to permit a defendant who caused an injury to a plaintiff to recover the
excess liability that had been imposed upon him by the ensuing malpractice of a treating physician. It presupposes that the initial tortfeasor is liable for all the harm, including that portion
that would not have occurred but for the malpractice. The Florida Supreme Court initially
rejected this doctrine in Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977) on grounds that it
would permit the initial defendant to turn a plaintiff's straightforward claim against the initial
tortfeasor into a complex, difficult and lengthy malpractice action. Later, however, the court
permitted equitable indemnity as a separate action in the nature of subrogation. See Underwriters of Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1980).
115. UNn?. CONTRmBUTION AMONG Jonrs ToaRTnAsoRs ACT, 12 U.L.A. 87 (1975).
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uity applicable to contribution shall apply." 6
Although these statements prescribe no specific rules, they do provide two general guidelines: relative degrees of fault shall not be determinative, and principles of equity shall apply.
Curiously, these guidelines appear utterly inconsistent with the
historical application of -equitable principles. Indeed, the rule of nocontribution among joint tortfeasors manifests a particular application of the principle that equity will not aid parties who come to the
court without "clean hands.""'1 When the complainant merely wants
to shift part of his tort losses to another joint tortfeasor, "in pari
delicto portio est conditio defendentis" applies to defeat his claim.
Thus, equitable principles as traditionally applied in tort law permit
no contribution.
In recent times, many courts have revolted against the common
law "all or nothing" approach and repudiated the no-contribution
rule."' In 1962 the Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly applied comparative degrees of fault as the standard of contribution." 9 In parallel developments, Florida, 20 California,' 2 ' and Michigan, 2 2 supplanted the all or nothing rule of contributory negligence with
2 3 Florida, 24 Illicomparative negligence.2 More recently, New York,
nois,125 and California1 1 supplanted the no-contribution rule with
comparative contribution. These revisions 2 were prompted by the

116. Id. § 2.
117. The rule is commonly said to originate with Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101
E.R. 1337 (1799). See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291,
331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972). Some courts applied the rule only to more severe forms of culpability than mere blameworthiness. See, e.g., Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167
N.W. 1048 (1918).
118. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act abandons equal pro rate shares and adopts equitable contribution, meaning basically in proportion to relative degrees of fault. Uniform Comparative Fault Act §§ 2, 3, 5, 12 U.L.A. 39, 42-43 (Supp. 1984). Only Indiana has adopted the
Act in toto. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983).
119. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105, 106 (1962).
120. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
121. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828-29, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
875 (1978).
122. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
123. Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851
(1972).
124. Licenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1978).
125. Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill.
126. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. 3d 578,
578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
127. The Florida court's revision differed from the others because the Florida court
deemed itself bound to follow the "no consideration of relative degrees of fault" dictates of the
Uniform Act that had been adopted by the legislature during the appeal of Licenberg v. Issen,
318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975). The Florida legislature later abandoned this position. FLA. STAT. §
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notion that it is more just to distribute losses according to degrees of
causal fault than to force all the loss to remain with the luckless
party upon whom it initially fell, whether that person is a contributorily negligent plaintiff or one of several joint tortfeasors. Thus
these courts ignored the Uniform Act's prohibition against distributing loss according to relative degrees of fault.
Distributing loss according to relative degrees of fault makes no
sense in product strict liability when all defendants are held responsible without the showing of any fault by anyone. Nevertheless,
where one defendant is held liable in product strict liability and a
second in negligence, there is no reason to limit a contribution petitioner to the same theory upon which the original plaintiff relied.
Even though the plaintiff might have no burden of proving fault
against one or more joint tortfeasors, contribution among them might
still turn on relative degrees of fault. The burden could be placed on
the contribution complainant to establish the fault of the contribution defendant and vice versa. Thus, a retailer of a defective product
who paid a product strict liability judgment to an injured victim
might seek contribution from the manufacturer. This approach could
apply regardless of whether some defendants were held liable to the
plaintiff on one ground and some on the other. Its main shortcoming
is practical; it would turn contribution actions into full scale evidentiary battles about fault, the very thing that product strict liability
seeks to avoid.
On the other hand, the theory of product strict liability suggests
that damages ought to be allocated among tortfeasors in a manner
that would diffuse the loss most widely among those who benefit
from the production and sale of the product. This approach shifts the
content of the litigation away from legal and ethical notions of comparative fault to economic notions of loss spreading. The courts have
yet to accept this task, much less agree upon an economic mechanism
for resolving loss distribution issues. Moreover, courts are not accustomed to applying detailed economic theories to resolve specific disputes and, by and large, have wisely eschewed any attempt to do
SO.128

A third approach would be to divide losses equally among the
joint tortfeasors, which, in the absence of special "equities," seems to
be the method of the Uniform Act. Simplicity is the prime virtue.
This rule imposes less demand upon the courts and lower costs upon
768.31(3) (1975) amended by ch. 76-186, 1976 Fla. Laws § 3-5.

128. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), represents an instance in
which a court made the decision that had to be made on grounds of special injury, a tried and
true formulation.
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litigants. Hence, when one or more defendants is strictly liable, efficiency and economy strongly commend contribution in equal pro rata
shares as prescribed by the Uniform Act.
A somewhat different. contribution approach is suggested by the
no-fault basis of product strict liability. Defendants who are liable
without fault should be permitted to shift the total burden onto defendants who are actually "responsible" for the defect that caused
the harm. Thus, an expanded indemnification doctrine has a proper
place. On the other hand, when several tortfeasors are "responsible"
for the defect, the law might justifiably permit a more robust comparative apportionment scheme than the one prescribed by the Uniform Act. The following example defines "responsible" and explicates
suitable bases for indemnification and apportionment.
Suppose a user of a product obtained a joint and several product
strict liability judgment of $70,000 against three defendants: a manufacturer, a distributor arid a retailer. Damages totaled $100,000, but
thirty percent of the responsibility was attributable to the plaintiff's
breach of duty to prevent harm, thereby reducing the judgment to
$70,000. The defect was a manufacturing flaw in a single product
which was packaged in a sealed container by the manufacturer and
later opened and assembled by the retailer. The manufacturer and
distributor were held liable in product strict liability, while the retaller was held liable in negligence for having failed to detect the flaw
during assembly. The plaintiff executed judgment against the distributor who thereafter seeks indemnification or contribution from the
manufacturer and retailer.
As to each party the first question is, "[w]as it commercially feasible for this party to have taken reasonable measures to avoid this
particular risk?" A negative reply as to a particular joint tortfeasor
provides adequate ground for him to be indemnified by other joint
tortfeasors. 12 9 If such a party paid any part of the judgment, he
should be indemnified by the parties who did have a commercially
feasible opportunity to avoid the harm. In this example, the distributor should possess a right of indemnification against the manufacturer and the retailer. The manufacturer created the harm, making it
commercially feasible for him to avoid the risk rather than suffer the
economic consequences for failure to do so. The retailer could also
have avoided the risk by exercising reasonable care in unpackaging
and assembling the product.13 0
129. Not possessing reasonable commercial capacity to avoid the risk subsumes both that
the particular defendant was not responsible for the creation or exacerbation of the risk and
that he did not unreasonably fail to warn of a defect he knew or ought to have known about.
130. It may be assumed that if the jury had found that it was infeasible for the retailer to
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The next question is how to apportion liability between the two
tortfeasors who could have feasibly avoided the risk. To avoid introducing a new set of decisional issues and evidential complexities into
the law, any rule that seeks to ascertain loss spreading capacity on a
case-by-case basis should be avoided. Two practical approaches remain: the Uniform Act's apportionment by equal pro rata shares, or
apportionment on the basis of comparative culpability. On the one
hand economy and efficiency argue for streamlining contribution law
without litigating relative degrees of fault, on the other the modern
judicial tendency is to permit a differential apportionment of liability
where the balance of blameworthiness is patently askew.
I propose an amalgamated model that presumes apportionment in
equal pro rata shares among joint tortfeasors who could have avoided
harm but permits a party to rebut the presumption by proving that a
different apportionment more justly represents the relative failures of
the parties. Thus, a major production error followed by a retailer's
mere failure to discover the resulting defect might cause a jury to
place most of the loss on the manufacturer; whereas, a single production flaw discovered but ignored by a retailer might cause a jury to
cast most of the burden upon him.
Against that background, product liability contribution principles
may be stated as follows:
1. (a) Whatever the respective theories of liability of joint
and several tortfeasors to a plaintiff, a tortfeasor who had no
feasible opportunity to avoid the risk of harm to the plaintiff
shall be indemnified of liability by the remaining joint and
several tortfeasors who did have such an opportunity.
(b) If the plaintiff does not bring an action against a
tortfeasor who had a feasible opportunity to avoid the risk of
harm, a tortfeasor seeking indemnification shall be entitled to
bring a third party action and prove the plaintiffs cause of
action against him.
(c) Indemnifying tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable to
the indemnified tortfeasor for the entire amount of the indemnification judgment.
2. (a) Whatever the respective theories of liability of joint
and several tortfeasors to a plaintiff, a tortfeasor who had a
feasible opportunity to avoid the risk to the plaintiff shall
have a right of contribution from other joint and several
tortfeasors who also had a feasible opportunity to avoid the
risk.
discover the product defect, he would have been found not negligent, thus entirely abating the
contribution issue as to him.
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(b) If the plaintiff did not join such a tortfeasor in his action,
a tortfeasor seeking contribution shall be entitled to bring a
third party action and prove the plaintiff's cause of action
against him.
(c) Contribution shall be presumed to be in equal pro rata
shares of the total liability to the plaintiff.
(d) Any tortfeasor may prove on the balance of all the evidence that justice requires pro rata apportionment on the basis of comparative failure to exercise feasible opportunities to
avoid the harm to the plaintiff. If such a finding is made, liability shall be apportioned accordingly.
3. (a) If no finding is made that any tortfeasor had a feasible opportunity to avoid risk of harm to the plaintiff, then all
tortfeasors found strictly liable to the plaintiff shall have a
right of contribution among each other in equal pro rata
shares.
(b) Any such tortfeasor may bring an action against any
tortfeasor who was not sued by the plaintiff and prove the
plaintiff's strict liability cause of action against him.
This is a statement of principles, not a statute. Procedures, statutes of limitation and the like remain to be prescribed by rule or
statute. Nevertheless, the statement provides the conceptual heart of
a contribution scheme that should eliminate much theoretic
confusion. 3 '
IV.

CONCLUSION

The overarching conclusion of this article is that the elements of
all product liability causes of action should be delineated in terms of
duty, breach, causation and damages and that the meaning of each
element should be clearly defined for each cause of action.' 3 ' Similarities and differences among negligence, strict product liability and
breach of warranty would then clearly emerge, perhaps removing
131. It should be noted that the scheme proposed here assumes that contribution will not
diminish the entitlement of the plaintiff against any of the joint and several tortfeasors; all
remain liable for the entirety of the plaintiff's verdict and the plaintiff, as under common law,
may proceed to collect from one or all until his judgment is satisfied. Some courts apparently
permit contribution to dilute the plaintiff's rights, limiting him to a pro rata recovery against
each of the defendants. See, e.g., Brown v. Keil, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978); Thibault v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 850 (N.H. 1978). This approach should be avoided.
132. It is not necessary, of course, that each element be totally independent. For example,
the factor of reasonable foreseeability has a role to play in duty, breach, and proximate causation in the law of negligence. Note also that these definitions do not resolve all the definitional
problems reposing in product strict liability theory. One of the more important areas not addressed herein is the question, "what is a product?" See, e.g., Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing,
65 Hawaii 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982) (holding that a pre-fabricated building is a product).
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much of the confusion that has befuddled the law for more than a
hundred years. The more specific conclusions may be summarized as
follows:
1. The duty of product strict liability should be expanded as a
pure tort theory to embrace suitable classes of defendants upon consideration of appropriate policy factors. Economic and risk avoidance
considerations should be given substantial if not controlling weight in
these decisions but the central basis of negligence, namely "a general
public sentiment of moral wrongdoing," 133 should play no part. Strict
liability should not be applied to defendant classes that cannot protect the interests that justify imposition of liability without fault. For
example, the duty of product strict liability should not be applied to
a housewife selling an article at a garage sale.134
2. Privity and status, such as user and consumer, should be considered only in determining whether a negligence or product strict
liability duty exists. The fact that a plaintiff was not in privity and
was not a user or consumer might persuade a court that no-duty existed in a particular case, but the judge ought to examine all appropriate factors before rejecting a claim on no-duty grounds. While no
inclusive list of criteria can be prescribed, it seems probable that the
conglomerate will merge into the almost universal test of reasonable
foreseeability. 135
3. When applicable, product strict liability should absorb negligence liability in toto and no further negligence pleading and litigation should be permitted once it is determined that product strict
liability applies. This assumes that the product strict liability duty
will completely subsume the field covered by negligence duty and
that elements of causation-in-fact, proximate causation, and damages
in product strict liability either will be identical to or more inclusive
than those of negligence. It also assumes that no product strict liabil133. Donoghue, 1932 A.C. at 580 (Lord Atkin).
134. No disapproval is intended of the § 402A choice to impose strict liability upon business sellers of commercial products, including manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers but excluding non-business sellers such as the housewife. This article merely suggests that some
courts might differ in whether or not particular classes of sellers should be covered upon careful
consideration of appropriate policies. Certain policies might justify extention of the product
strict liability duty to classes that are not sellers. See Harris v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 550 F.
Supp. 1024 (W.D. Va.) (where a franchisor was held liable).
135. For brevity and style, the famous statements of Cardozo in PaIsgrafand Lord Atkin
in Donoghue are hard to improve. Said Cardozo, "the orbit of danger as disclosed to the eye of
reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of duty." Palsgraf v. Long Island I&R., 248 N.Y. 339,
343, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). And Atkin, "[Proximity determines duty] if proximity be not
confined to mere physical proximity, but be used.., to extend to such close and direct relations that the act complained of directly affects a person whom the person alleged to be bound
to take care would know would be directly affect by his careless act." Donoghue 1932 A.C. at
581.
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ity defense is more corrosive to a plaintiff's action than the corresponding negligence defense. If a plaintiff could not recover in product strict liability, a fortiori he could not recover in negligence.
Alternative pleading in negligence and product strict liability
would still be permitted where a plaintiff was uncertain about
whether product strict liability applied to a particular defendant.
Once the court decides that product strict liability is applicable, all
considerations of negligence should cease.'"
4. The meaning of "defective" in product strict liability should be
defined by the following standard:
A product is defective when it causes harm to a person or
property as a consequence of a condition that poses a greater
risk of harm than would be expected by a reasonable person
of ordinary prudence fully informed about expectable uses of
the product and the1 expectable
manner and places in which it
7
would be employed.
This permits the fact finder to assume familiar position of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence rather than the unfamiliar positions of manufacturer, user or consumer as required by other tests.
5. Causation-in-fact ad proximate causation should be assigned
136. The Minnesota Supreme Court faced up to this in Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347
N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 1984). Inherent in this case is the problem of mixing ordinary negligence and strict liability where the only basis for liability is failure to warn.
To avoid this problem in the future, we hold that hereafter, where a plaintiff seeks damages for both negligence and strict liability based solely upon failure to warn, the plaintiff may submit the case to the jury on only one theory. The plaintiff can plead and
prove at trial either or both theories, but by the time the parties rest, the plaintiff must
announce whether the case will be submitted to the jury on negligence or strict liability.
137. The following instruction approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hauenstein
v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 1984) represents a modified version of this
approach.
A product is in a defective condition if, at the time it leaves the manufacturer's hands, it
is in a condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user. A condition is
unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous when used by an ordinary user who uses it
with the knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics and
common usage.
The Minnesota approach is subject to confusion because of the ambiguity as to whether the
"ordinary user" includes only customary uses as of industrial materials, or all foreseeable users.
The proposal herein, eliminates that confusion. Cf. Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602
S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980) wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the prudent manufacturer instruction. In doing so, it repudiated the following instruction: "A product is 'unreasonably dangerous' only if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
an ordinary adult purchaser thereof, with ordinary knowledge as to its inherent characteristics." Id. at 432.
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the identical roles and standards of application in product strict liability as in the law of negligence.
6. Compensatory damages should be computed identically in
product strict liability as in the law of negligence and punitive damages should
be permitted only under settled standards of
138
culpability.

7. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuriashould be retained as a
complete affirmative defense to product strict liability, requiring voluntary assumption of a known and appreciated risk. Plaintiffs' duty
to prevent harm as described herein should be recognized as the only
comparative defense. Jurisdictions would be free to include within
this defense a plaintiff's failure to discover a defect or not.
8. Indemnification should be employed to permit joint and several
tortfeasors who had no feasible opportunity to avoid risk to the
plaintiff to shift the entire burden of liability to those who did. Joint
and several tortfeasors who did have such an opportunity should be
entitled to contribution among themselves. Contribution would be in
equal pro rata shares unless a tortfeasor proves that it is more just to
apportion liability on the basis of comparative fault.

138. Cases that have permitted punitive damages in product strict liability actions include Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983) and Fischer v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 113, 472 A.2d 577 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1984). See also
Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 438 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
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